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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys revisions to the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.) and decisions interpreting Georgia law from June
1, 2020, through May 31, 2021, that affect labor and employment
relations for Georgia employers.1
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II. RECENT LEGISLATION
A. Time and Accommodations for Nursing Mothers
Effective August 5, 2020, employers must provide for reasonable
unpaid break time each day for an employee who needs to express breast
milk at the worksite during work hours. 2 Employers must provide “a
private location, other than a restroom,” 3 where the employee can express
breast milk (previously, the language was permissive and stated that an
employer “may make reasonable efforts” to provide a room or other
location to the employee).4 Employers who have less than fifty employees
can utilize an exception to this obligation if it would impose an undue
hardship on the employer.5
B. SB 288: Changes in Georgia’s Criminal History Report Records
“On January 1, 2021, Georgia joined forty-one other states in
allowing a person to remove certain convictions from their criminal
record after a period of ‘conviction-free’ years.” 6 Senate Bill 2887
amended section 35-3-37 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated to
allow individuals with certain felony and misdemeanor convictions on
their record the potential to clear and restrict their criminal history
report or criminal record by allowing the restriction and sealing of up to
two misdemeanor convictions during a person’s lifetime and of pardoned
felonies.8 Additionally, once sealed, an individual’s criminal history
record information is not available to private persons or businesses.9
Notably, SB 288 also added a new code section 24-4-419 of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated,10 which provides protections to employers
who bring suit based on conduct of their employees or agents. In those
cases, the employee’s criminal history will not be admissible against an
employer if:

2. O.C.G.A. § 34-1-6 (2020).
3. O.C.G.A. § 34-1-6(b).
4. O.C.G.A. § 34-1-6(b) (2019).
5. O.C.G.A. § 34-1-6(c).
6. Jordan A. Fishman, Georgia’s SB 288: Giving Rehabilitated Individuals a Second
Chance, STOKES WAGNER, https://stokeswagner.com/publications/georgia-s-sb-288-givingrehabilitated-individuals-a-second-chance (date of website access) (citing O.C.G.A. § 35-337 (2021)).
7. Ga. S. Bill 288, Reg. Sess. (2020).
8. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(j)(4)(C) (2021).
9. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(a)(6) (2021).
10. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-419(b) (2021).
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(1) The nature of such criminal history record information is not
relevant to the facts underlying such proceeding or the veracity of the
witness;
(2) Prior to the act giving rise to such proceedings, criminal history
record information was restricted or sealed as provided in Code Section
35-3-37, or a pardon for such conduct was granted; or
(3) Such criminal history information is for an arrest or charge that
did not result in a conviction.11

C. SB 443: Changes in Georgia’s Garnishment Laws
On August 5, 2020, Governor Brian Kemp signed Senate Bill 443, 12
which modified portions of section 18-4-1 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated, Georgia’s garnishment laws. 13 The amendment went into
effect on January 1, 2021. 14 The most notable change for employers was
the garnishment period for continuing garnishments being extended
from 179 days (six months) to 1,095 days (three years).15 Thus, employers
facing continuing garnishments must file answers through the 1,095-day
period, or until the debt has been repaid in full or otherwise discharged. 16
SB 443 also expanded the garnishment statute to now apply to a
person or entity “under periodic obligations for payment,” which can
include independent contractors and workers in the “gig” economy. 17 For
employers that hire an independent contractor or “an employee of such
garnishee subject to federal and state income tax withholding,” the
employer is not considered to have knowledge of or have an obligation to
determine any exemptions based on disposable earnings, until the
garnishee is served with or consents to a court order or filed modification
form that establishes an alternative basis for determining the amount
subject to garnishment.18 In light of these new changes to the Georgia
garnishment laws, all Georgia employers should review their internal
policies and procedures for processing garnishments and adjust them
accordingly.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Ga. S. Bill 443, Reg. Sess. (2020).
O.C.G.A. § 18-4-1 (2021).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 18-4-4(c)(1) (2021).
Ga. S. Bill 443, Reg. Sess.
O.C.G.A. § 18-4-41(a) (2021).
O.C.G.A. § 18-4-5(a)(4) (2021).
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III. WRONGFUL TERMINATION
A. Employment At-Will
For an employment agreement to be enforceable, it must include all
necessary terms, and the term of employment must be definite. 19 If an
employment contract does not state the duration of the term of
employment, the contract is “terminable at the will of either party.” 20
In Zulke v. AC&DC Power Technologies, LLC,21 the Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed the Clayton County Superior Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the employer defendant, holding that the Georgia
Statute of Frauds did not bar the plaintiff’s contract of employment,
including the benefit provisions. 22 In April of 2012, the defendant made
a verbal employment offer to James Zulke, and subsequently emailed
him a written offer specifying the terms of his employment as the chief
operations officer.23 The letter that the defendant sent was dated March
2012, and had no employment start date or duration dates; but did
provide “a first year salary of $130,000, with an incentive payment ‘after
the first year of operations’ conditional on meeting company goals in
overhead reduction, profitability, and revenue increase.” 24
On April 23, 2012, Zulke returned the defendant’s edited employment
contract document with an added provision that if he was terminated for
any reason within the first year, he would receive “nine ‘monthly
payments of the base salary amount paid on the first of each month,’
reduced to six payments if he was ‘terminated for any reason during the
second and third years.’”25 Zulke began his employment in May of 2012
and was later terminated in September of 2014. Zulke did not receive the
value of his ownership interest, nor any incentive bonus or severance
upon his termination, and sued the company for breach of contract,
promissory estoppel, and attorney’s fees. 26
The court of appeals held that since the employment was terminable
at will at any point, it logically could have been terminated within the
first year and did not fall under the Georgia Statute of Frauds. 27
However, after he completed his first year, he was only entitled to the
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

James W. Wimberly, Georgia Employment Law § 1-2 (3rd ed. 2000).
Parker v. Crider Poultry, 275 Ga. 361, 362, 565 S.E.2d 797, 798 (2002).
356 Ga. App. 299, 846 S.E.2d 624 (2020).
Id. at 300, 846 S.E.2d at 626–27.
Id. at 299, 846 S.E.2d at 626.
Id.
Id. at 299–300, 846 S.E.2d at 626.
Id. at 300, 846 S.E.2d at 626.
Id. at 303, 846 S.E.2d at 628.
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pay that he earned up to discharge because he was an employee at will
and did not have a contract entitling him to any more pay for his work. 28
The court of appeals denied summary judgment as to the benefits issue
as well because, arguably, Zulke earned the severance agreement upon
commencement of his second year, which means it also was not barred
by the Statute of Frauds.29 Therefore, the court remanded this issue back
to the trial court for a jury to decide.30
IV. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held
vicariously liable for the negligence or intentional torts of employees that
are committed within the scope of their employment. 31 To hold an
employer vicariously liable for the torts of an employee, the following
elements must be established: (1) the employee was acting in furtherance
of the employer’s business; and (2) the employee was acting within the
scope of the employer’s business.32
A. Vicarious Liability and Apportionment of Fault
In Quynn v. Hulsey,33 the Supreme Court of Georgia fundamentally
reversed prior precedent commencing in the 1960’s, when it held that
section 51-12-33 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, 34 known as
the apportionment statute, abrogated the respondeat superior rule.35 The
longstanding precedent for negligence cases in Georgia was that a
plaintiff may not recover damages if they are 50% or more at fault.36
When the tortious conduct was done by an employed person in the course
and scope of business, an employer could defeat claims of negligent
hiring, supervision, training, entrustment, or retention by admitting that
it is vicariously liable under respondeat superior.37 By admitting

28. Id. (quoting E.D. Lacey Mills v. Keith, 183 Ga. App. 357, 359, 359 S.E.2d 148, 152
(1987)).
29. Id. at 303, 846 S.E.2d at 628.
30. Id.
31. Charles R. Adams III, Georgia Law of Torts § 7:2 (2017–2018 ed.).
32. Id.
33. 310 Ga. 473, 850 S.E.2d 725 (2020).
34. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 (2021).
35. Quynn, 310 Ga. at 481, 850 S.E.2d at 731–32.
36. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(g) (2021).
37. Quynn, 310 Ga. App. at 474–75, 850 S.E.2d at 727.
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respondeat superior, the employer’s own negligence would not be
considered by the jury for purpose of apportioning damages. 38
Here, the defendant, Riley Hulsey, was driving a truck owned by his
employer, TriEst, when he struck and killed an individual attempting to
cross the street. The administrator of the estate brought a wrongful death
and personal injury action against the defendant and his employer,
alleging negligent entrustment, hiring, training, and supervision. The
jury found that the decedent was 50% at fault, and the defendant and his
employer were 50% at fault; thus, the estate could not recover damages. 39
The State Court of Gwinnett County, affirmed by the Georgia Court of
Appeals, held that TriEst was entitled to summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s claims for negligent entrustment, hiring, training, supervision,
and retention, as the statute and case law precedent provided. 40
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the
employer’s independent acts of negligently hiring, entrusting, retaining,
and supervising are separable from the employee’s actions—not a
“concerted act between an employer and its employee”—thus, the
plaintiff’s claims of negligent hiring, training, entrustment, and
supervision were in themselves allegations of fault within the
apportionment statute.41
The supreme court held that the lower courts erred, within the plain
language and strict construction of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33, by not
apportioning fault onto TriEst, and erred in finding that TriEst’s own
admittance of vicarious liability entitled it to summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s claims.42 Analyzing and construing the statute strictly, the
court concluded that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 “mandates that the jury be
allowed to consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the alleged
injury or damages,” and abrogated the historic precedent of the
respondeat superior rule.43
B. Vicarious Liability and Negligence
In Johnson v. Avis Rent A Car System, LLC,44 Brianna Johnson and
Adriene Smith were seriously injured when they were struck by a stolen

38. Hosp. Auth. of Valdosta v. Fender, 342 Ga. App. 13, 23, 802 S.E.2d 346, 355 (2017);
MasTec N. Am. v. Wilson, 325 Ga. App. 863, 865, 755 S.E.2d 257, 259 (2014).
39. Quynn, 310 Ga. App. at 473–74, 850 S.E.2d at 727. See generally
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(g) (2021).
40. Quynn, 310 Ga. at 474, 850 S.E.2d at 727.
41. Id. at 480, 850 S.E.2d at 731.
42. Id. at 481, 850 S.E.2d at 731–32.
43. Id.
44. 311 Ga. 588, 858 S.E.2d 23 (2021).

2021

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

143

sport utility vehicle driven by Byron Perry. Perry stole the car from his
place of employment, Avis Rent A Car Systems, LLC. Johnson and Smith
each sued Avis, Avis Budget Group, Inc., Peter Duca (a regional security
manager for Avis Budget Group), as well as CSYG, Inc., the operator of
the downtown Avis location, and Yonas Gebremichael, CSYG’s owner.45
Avis appealed the denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, and Johnson appealed the grant of Avis’s motion for a new
trial on the issue of liability.46 The Georgia Court of Appeals concluded
Avis was entitled to the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
on Johnson’s direct negligence claims, since Perry’s criminal conduct was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.47
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, agreeing that the
defendants could not be liable to Johnson and Smith, finding Perry’s
criminal conduct was not a probable or natural consequence which could
have been reasonably foreseen.48 The Avis facility had only one car stolen
previously in 2012, and the evidence did not show that the plaintiff’s
injuries were reasonably foreseeable due to failing to secure the Avis
parking lot from theft.49 The supreme court also analyzed whether Perry
acted “‘under color of’ . . . employment,” by committing an unauthorized
act in a way that purports the act is done by reason and virtue of his
employment.50 Here, Perry stole the car after working hours, when he
was not able to access Avis vehicles like during a normal workday. 51 He
was not accessing the cars in any employment capacity, thus not acting
“‘under color of’ . . . employment,” at the time he injured the plaintiffs.52
In Hobbs v. Integrated Fire Protection,53 the Gwinnett State Court
granted summary judgment for Integrated Fire Protection (IFP), and the
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed.54 Ethan Hobbs filed suit against IFP
alleging wrongful death and negligence in his mother’s death. At the time
of the accident, the decedent, Victoria Eagle was in a relationship with
Jason Johnson, the superintendent for IFP, and as the superintendent,
Johnson received a company vehicle and a gas card. Prior to working at
IFP, Johnson was convicted of a DUI, which IFP was aware of. IFP’s

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 588, 858 S.E.2d at 26.
Id. at 588–89, 858 S.E.2d at 26–27.
Id. at 588, 858 S.E.2d at 27.
Id. at 589, 858 S.E.2d at 27.
Id. at 591, 858 S.E.2d at 28.
Id. at 599, 858 S.E.2d at 34.
Id. at 600, 858 S.E.2d at 34.
Id.
357 Ga. App. 790, 850 S.E.2d 256 (2020).
Id. at 790, 850 S.E.2d at 260.
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policy for vehicle use was only for business purposes, unless provided
prior approval.55
On the night of Eagle’s death, Eagle and Johnson went to a sports bar
to drink. Eagle walked off from the bar after an incident with another
patron, and Johnson got into the IFP vehicle to search for her. Around
the time Johnson was searching for Eagle, Denise Martin and Dawn
Remington were also leaving the bar. When Johnson spotted Eagle across
the street, he parked the truck partially in the street and got out. As
Remington was driving, she saw IFP’s vehicle that Johnson left and
drove around it. Subsequently, Remington ran over Eagle, killing her. 56
The trial court granted IFP’s motion for summary judgment,
determining that IFP was not vicariously liable for negligence, because
Johnson was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time
of the accident, and there was no evidence that IFP was negligent in
hiring and supervising Johnson. The court found that IFP’s knowledge of
Johnson’s prior conviction did not “qualify as actual knowledge sufficient
to raise a jury question regarding dangerous propensity.” 57
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court, affirming that
Johnson was not working at the time of the accident, and that fact was
sufficient to rebut a presumption that he was acting within the scope of
his employment at the time of the accident. 58 The court also noted that,
although Johnson was an on-call employee, his on-call status was a
circumstantial fact and insufficient to defeat summary judgment.59 It
was not sufficient for the plaintiff to show constructive knowledge due to
the fact that the employer is not liable merely because the employer could
have ascertained the incompetency of the driver; the plaintiff needs to
show actual knowledge.60
In analyzing the negligent hiring and supervising claim, the court of
appeals concluded that Johnson’s actions of leaving the bar to search for
Eagle were not in furtherance of any business related to IFP, and thus,
IFP could not have ratified Johnson’s conduct.61 “An employer may ratify
tortious conduct by an employee, and thereby assume liability for
unauthorized conduct, but for liability to be imposed on the employer by
ratification, there must be evidence that the employee’s conduct was done

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 791, 850 S.E.2d at 260–61.
Id. at 791, 850 S.E.2d at 261.
Id. at 792, 850 S.E.2d at 262.
Id. at 793, 850 S.E.2d at 262.
Id. at 794, 858 S.E.2d at 262.
Id. at 801, 850 S.E.2d at 266–67.
Id. at 796–97, 850 S.E.2d at 264.
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in furtherance of the employer’s business and within the scope of
employment.”62
In DMAC81, LLC v. Nguyen,63 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that
the employer of a driver involved in a fatal car accident was not liable
under the theories of either respondeat superior, or negligent hiring and
retention.64 Specifically, the court held that the special circumstances
exception and special mission exception did not apply to the facts of this
case.65
Cummings was an employee of McAllister’s Deli, owned by DMAC81,
LLC (DMAC81). He worked on the grill line, but also occasionally
assisted with making catering deliveries when requested by his boss. On
the days he had catering deliveries, Cummings would go into the store
early to prepare the line, and then he would make the catering deliveries
in his personal vehicle. Prior to preparing the line earlier than his
scheduled shift, Cummings had to receive permission from the manager
to come in early but would be paid for all time worked and received a
separate payment to reimburse his gas. 66
On a day when the surrounding area was under state of emergency
due to a winter storm, Cummings’s manager asked him to deliver a
catering order. As Cummings was on his way to the store, he hit a car in
the emergency lane and killed Tuan Nguyen and his brother-in-law. A
drug test revealed that Cummings had marijuana in his system, and it
was also discovered that he had smoked marijuana and taken pain
medication after his shift the previous day. The assistant general
manager for DMAC81 was friends with Cummings and knew he smoked
marijuana occasionally.67
However, DMAC81 did not conduct background checks or review
driving histories of their employees, but it did have a question on its
application as to whether the applicant had any driving accidents or
tickets within the previous three years. Thus, DMAC81 was unaware
that Cummings had prior arrests for marijuana possession, as well as
traffic tickets for reckless driving and driving under the influence that
were over seven years old.68

62. Id. at 797, 850 S.E.2d at 264 (quoting Travis Pruitt & Assocs., P. C. v. Hooper, 277
Ga. App. 1, 625 S.E.2d 445 (2005)).
63. 358 Ga. App. 170, 853 S.E.2d 400 (2021).
64. Id. at 174, 853 S.E.2d at 405.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 170, 853 S.E.2d at 402–03.
67. Id. at 170–71, 853 S.E.2d at 403.
68. Id. at 171, 853 S.E.2d at 403.
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DMAC81 moved for summary judgment and was granted partial
summary judgment by the Bibb County Superior Court on DMAC81’s
claim that an employer was not liable for an accident caused by its
employee when the employee is on his way to work. However, the trial
court found that there was a question of fact as to whether Cummings
was on a special mission for DMAC81. 69
In its analysis, the Georgia Court of Appeals first stated the basic law
for vicarious liability:
Every master shall be liable for torts committed by his servant by his
command or in the prosecution and within the scope of his
business . . . the test to determine whether or not the servant was at
the time of injury acting within the scope of his employment and on
the business of the master . . . . There is a longstanding general rule
that an employee is engaged in a purely personal matter while
commuting to or from work.70

However, the court of appeals explained that there are exceptions to
this tenet.71 In particular, the special circumstances exception and the
special mission exception. Under the special circumstance’s exception,
the court noted that “[t]he law is clear that in the absence of special
circumstances a servant in going to and from work in an automobile acts
only for his own purposes and not for those of his employer.” 72
Under the special mission exception, the court of appeals held that the
trial court erred in finding a question of fact because there was no
evidence that would allow the jury to find that Cummings was engaged
in a special mission.73 The special mission exception applies if the
employee was on a “special service or errand . . . in the interest of, or
under the direction of, his employer” on the way from home to his work. 74
The focus of the task must be on whether the employer made a direct
request or direction that is “‘special’ or ‘uncustomary.’”75
Here, the court held that there was no special exception.76 Cummings
made his usual commute to work; he drove his own car and had not yet
69. Id.
70. Id. at 172, 853 S.E.2d at 403–04 (citing Centurion Indus. v. Naville-Saeger, 352 Ga.
App. 342, 344, 834 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2019)).
71. Id. at 172, 853 S.E.2d at 404.
72. Id. at 173, 853 S.E.2d at 404 (citing Hargett’s Tel. Contrs. v. McKeehan, 228 Ga.
App. 168, 170, 491 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1997)).
73. Id. at 171–72, 853 S.E.2d at 403.
74. Id. at 174, 853 S.E.2d at 405 (citing Centurion Indus., 352 Ga. App. at 345–46, 834
S.E.2d at 879).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 174, 853 S.E.2d at 405.
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clocked in; and he did not receive pay for his commute time. 77 The fact
that he was “on call” to make deliveries was not availing, especially since
he was already scheduled to work that day. In analyzing the above facts,
the court determined that no special circumstances applied to Cummings
as to impute liability to DMAC81. 78 Thus, the court of appeals granted
DMAC81’s motion for summary judgment on this issue. Because the
court ruled that Cummings was commuting to work and was not engaged
in work for DMAC81, the claim for negligent retention and hiring
failed.79
C. Independent Contractor
Respondeat superior liability does not generally extend to actions or
conduct by independent contractors. 80 A court must first resolve the issue
of whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor,
which is determined by examining whether the employer has assumed
the right to control the time, manner, and method of executing the
work.81
In Wilson v. Guy,82 Hunter Guy and V.J. Williamson worked for Robert
Wilson at Wilson Builders, Inc. Occasionally, Wilson would ask his
employees to perform tasks like landscaping, cleaning, and other
property maintenance around his home on the weekends for extra
income. This work was offered completely separate from the work done
at Wilson’s company and was done for Wilson’s personal benefit. Guy and
Williamson went to Wilson’s home to assist him. Wilson left his property
and instructed Guy to listen to Williamson. At some point in the day,
Williamson told Guy to trim the fence and burn the brush. Guy gathered
the brush and spread gasoline on the pile, at which point it ignited and
severely burned him. Guy filed suit against Wilson for damages, claiming
negligent supervision and training on using gasoline to burn brush, along
with a claim of respondeat superior. Wilson filed for summary judgment,
and the Gwinnett County Superior Court denied the motion.83

77. Id. at 173, 853 S.E.2d at 404.
78. Id. at 174, 853 S.E.2d at 405.
79. Id. at 176, 853 S.E.2d at 406.
80. O.C.G.A. § 51-2-4 (2021). “An employer generally is not responsible for torts
committed by his employee when the employee exercises an independent business and in it
is not subject to the immediate direction and control of the employer.” Id.
81. Williamson v. Coastal Physician Servs. of the Se., Inc., 251 Ga. App. 667, 668, 554
S.E.2d 739, 741 (2001).
82. 356 Ga. App. 509, 848 S.E.2d 138 (2020).
83. Id. at 509–10, 848 S.E.2d at 140–41.
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The Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that Williamson and Guy
were independent contractors at the time of the fire, and Wilson was not
liable for Guy’s injuries.84 Wilson did not tell Guy or Williamson how to
perform the tasks, what tools to use, or what procedure to follow.85
Although they worked for Wilson at his company, they were still
independent contractors while performing work at Wilson’s house. 86
Thus, Wilson was not liable for Guy’s injuries.87
In Stubbs Oil Company v. Price,88 the estates of three deceased victims
sued the insurer and insured because of the insured’s third-party motor
carrier accident while delivering products. The estates alleged vicarious
liability against the insured, as the statutory employer of the truck driver
and carrier, and liability under a statute which allows direct actions
against a motor carrier insurer for hire. The insured and insurer filed for
summary judgment, which was denied by the Gordon Superior Court,
finding that the third-party carrier could only operate as a private motor
carrier.89 The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed this decision. 90
Mark Hinson was driving a tanker truck for Southern Oil Refinery,
LLC when it collided with the decedents’ car. Stubbs Oil hired Southern
Oil to deliver fuel to its customers and insurer.91 The court of appeals
held that the evidence showed Stubbs Oil executed a contract with BP,
which allowed Stubbs to buy fuel from BP and resell it to retail BP gas
stations.92 Once the fuel was in Stubbs’s possession, it owned the fuel
along with title and risk of passing. To deliver fuel to the gas station
customers, Stubbs hired third-party motor carriers to transport the fuel
with tankers, and Southern Oil was one of those carriers. Stubbs did this
without written contracts with the carriers and would email the carrier
the loading ticket if they were interested in picking up the work. Upon
completion, Stubbs would receive a bill of landing and invoice to pay the
third-party carrier. Hinson was dispatched the delivery request from
Stubbs and was on the way to the BP terminal to pick up the fuel when
the accident occurred.93
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The court of appeals held that Stubbs acted as a shipper during this
transaction, as Stubbs hired Southern Oil, and Southern Oil used its own
driver and tank.94 In its holding, the court noted it has previously held
that the presence of a lease between the defendant and owner of the
vehicle is “the defining element in creating a statutory employment
relationship under the [Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations]
(FMCSRs).”95 Stubbs did not own the tanker truck, which had Southern
Oil’s logo and Department of Transportation number; there was no
written or oral lease between Stubbs and Southern Oil; Hinson was
directly employed by Southern Oil; and Stubbs had no control over
Hinson or Southern Oil beyond asking them to deliver the fuel. 96 For
those reasons, the court of appeals also determined that Stubbs could not
be vicariously liable since it was an independent contractor. 97
In Stalwart Films, LLC v. Bernecker,98 the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that a stuntman was an employee or borrowed servant of the film
company and not an independent contractor.99 John Bernecker was a
stunt actor for the show, The Walking Dead. During the performance of
a stunt, Bernecker suffered a fatal fall. Bernecker’s estate brought a
claim of negligence against the production company and others involved
with the show. The defendants moved for summary judgment and were
denied by the Gwinnett County State Court. The defendants also moved
for directed verdict, arguing that Bernecker was an employee or
borrowed servant of the defendant, and thus his claims would be barred
by the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA). Alternatively, even if
Bernecker was an independent contractor, the defendant was his
statutory employer, and thus his claims would also be barred by the
WCA. The motion was denied, and the jury delivered a verdict for the
plaintiff.100 The defendants appealed the verdict, and the court of appeals
reversed.101
The court of appeals held that Bernecker was an employee of Stalwart,
and it rejected the argument that Bernecker was an independent
contractor because he received a 1099 and not a W-2, and as previous
precedent has established, that fact does not create a jury question. 102
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The court utilized prior precedent in analyzing “whether the contract
gives, or the employer assumes, the right to control the time, manner and
method of executing the work,” to conclude that Bernecker was not an
independent contractor.103
V. BUSINESS TORTS
A. Restrictive Covenants
The Georgia Constitution was amended in 2011, which changed the
focus and analysis for courts as to whether a covenant restricts future
employment in a reasonable manner. 104 This amendment also allows
courts to “blue pencil” agreements made after 2011 in order to avoid the
invalidation of the entire agreement.105 However, agreements made
before the approval of the amendment are not subject to blue penciling.106
These agreements will be held valid as a partial restraint only when the
agreement is specific and reasonable in regard to duration, geographic
restriction, and scope of the activities prohibited.107
As indicated below, and in past Survey periods, courts continue to
invalidate agreements because they were entered into prior to 2011 and
have invalid provisions under Georgia law. 108 Under Georgia law,
employers can require at-will employees to sign a new agreement, with
continued employment as sufficient consideration. 109 For employment
contracts for a specific term, employers must offer additional
consideration, such as monetary payment or other benefits, as the
employer is already obligated to continued employment.110
In Grayhawk Homes, Inc. v. Addison,111 the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that an employee signed an agreement that contained an

103. Id. at 240–41, 855 S.E.2d at 124.
104. GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 5(c)(3); See also O.C.G.A. § 13-8-50 (2021). For a more
in-depth legislative and political history of the restrictive covenant constitutional
amendment, see W. Melvin Haas II, et al., Labor and Employment Law, 71 MERCER L. REV.
137 (2019).
105. See Cox v. Altus Healthcare & Hospice, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 28, 31, 706 S.E.2d 660,
664 (2011).
106. Vulcan Steel Structures, Inc. v. McCarty, 329 Ga. App. 220, 220, 764 S.E.2d 458,
459 (2014).
107. Cox, 308 Ga. App. at 31, 706 S.E.2d at 664; see also W.R. Grace & Co., Dearborn
Div. v. Mouyal, 262 Ga. 465, 465, 422 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1992).
108. See Haas et al., supra note 106, at 137 n. 1.
109. Thomas v. Coastal Indus. Servs., Inc., 214 Ga. 832, 833, 108 S.E.2d 328, 329 (1959).
110. Glisson v. Global Sec. Servs., LLC, 287 Ga. App. 640, 641–42, 653 S.E.2d 85, 86–87
(2007).
111. 355 Ga. App. 612, 845 S.E.2d 356 (2020).
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unenforceable penalty provision. 112 However, the court found that, even
without a severability clause, the provision was severable from the rest
of the employment contract. Thus, the employer was still able to seek
actual damages at trial. Grayhawk Homes sued its former employee, Bill
Addison, for breach of the restrictive covenants contained in an
“Agreement Not to Compete or Disclose Confidential Information.”113
The agreement contained separate non-compete, non-disclosure, and
non-solicitation covenants, as well as a liquidated damages provision. 114
The liquidated damages provision stated that “in the event of Addison’s
breach of this Agreement, Grayhawk shall be entitled to liquidated
damages in the amount of $100,000, plus $50,000 for each year or any
portion thereof that Addison was employed by Grayhawk.” 115 There was
no explanation given as to how the liquidated damages amount was
calculated. Addison quit working for Grayhawk after a year and a half,
and then went to work for America’s Home Place, Inc., where he worked
for eight years prior to joining Grayhawk. Grayhawk initiated suit
against Addison claiming breach of the restrictive covenant and for
punitive damages and attorney’s fees.116
The Muscogee County Superior Court granted summary judgment in
favor of Addison and found that the liquidated damages provision
contained in the agreement was an unenforceable penalty provision. The
trial court found that the entire agreement was void because it did not
contain a severability clause to allow the unenforceable penalty to be
severed from the rest of the agreement.117
The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s decision that the
liquidated damages provision was an unenforceable penalty because
Grayhawk failed to show that the amount contained in the provision was
a reasonable pre-estimate of its probable loss resulting from Addison’s
breach of the agreement.118 However, the court disagreed with the trial
court’s determination that the unenforceable penalty provision voided
the entire agreement without a severability clause within the
agreement.119 Specifically, the court noted that “the intent of the parties
determines whether a contract is severable.” 120 “The parties’ intent may
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be expressed directly, through a severability clause, or indirectly, as
when the contract contains promises to do several things based upon
multiple considerations.”121 The court concluded that Addison’s promise
to pay liquidated damages due to a breach was a separate promise not to
breach the other covenants contained in the agreement, as the liquidated
damages provision was even contained in its own separate section. 122
Therefore, the parties intended the contract to be severable, and
Grayhawk could seek its actual damages on remand. 123
In Wanna v. Navicent Health, Inc.,124 Dr. Fady S. Wanna executed an
Executive Agreement to serve as an administrator for Navicent, while
maintaining his private medical practice. Subsequently, Dr. Wanna
entered into a Physician Agreement with Navicent, wherein he would
work as a part-time physician and surgeon for the hospital, while still
serving as an administrator.125
Prior to entering into the Physician Agreement, Dr. Wanna also
performed surgeries and procedures at Coliseum Medical Center
(Coliseum), another hospital in the area. After signing the Physician
Agreement, Dr. Wanna continued to perform surgeries and procedures at
Coliseum, while Navicent billed and collected for those surgeries and
procedures. Subsequently, Dr. Wanna entered into an Asset Purchase
Agreement with Navicent, in which Navicent purchased assets of the
professional corporation Dr. Wanna and his practice partners owned.
Both the Physician Agreement and the Asset Purchase Agreement
contained non-compete and non-solicitation provisions applicable to Dr.
Wanna in his capacity as a surgeon.126
Dr. Wanna eventually resigned as an administrator for Navicent and
modified his Physician Agreement to be a full-time staff physician. About
a year later, Navicent adopted a policy that its staff physicians could not
perform services for patients at other facilities, including Coliseum. Dr.
Wanna discontinued providing services at Navicent and continued to
perform surgeries and procedures at Coliseum, which resulted in a suit
from Navicent.127
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the restrictive covenants were
valid and that genuine issues of fact remained as to whether a “private

121. Id. (citing Vegesina v. Allied Informatics, 257 Ga. App. 693, 694, 572 S.E.2d 51, 53
(2002)).
122. Id. at 616–17, 845 S.E.2d at 360.
123. Id. at 617, 845 S.E.2d at 360.
124. 357 Ga. App. 140, 850 S.E.2d 191 (2020).
125. Id. at 141, 850 S.E.2d at 196.
126. Id. at 142–43, 850 S.E.2d at 197.
127. Id. at 144–45, 850 S.E.2d at 197–98.
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practice exception” contained in the restrictive covenants applied in this
case.128 The court affirmed the decision denying Dr. Wanna’s motion for
summary judgment on the breach of restrictive covenants claims.129
VI. CONCLUSION
This Survey period consisted of many changes—albeit some
(hopefully) temporary—in the legal system and for employers during the
COVID-19 pandemic. Many courts shut down and did not consider cases,
and some plaintiffs may have delayed filing of their cases or appeals
because of the shutdown. However, with the cases decided by the Georgia
courts, it is clear that issues surrounding contingent workers are on the
rise for employers. We anticipate much more litigation and legislation as
the “gig economy” expands and becomes a more common avenue for work.
Employers should remain abreast of the changing law and update their
policies and practices accordingly.

128. Id. at 161, 850 S.E.2d at 208–09.
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